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THE FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION BILL IN SOUTH
AFRICA, SECOND DRAFT: LESSONS FROM AUSTRALIA*
ANDREWJ GODWIN
Senior Lecturer and Director, TransactionalLaw, Melbourne Law School,
University of Melbourne
ANDREW D SCHMULOW
Senior Research Associate, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne;
Visiting Researcher, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand,Johannesburg
INTRODUCTION
The proposed reforms to financial regulation in South Africa, as embodied
in the Financial Sector Regulation Bill, (second draft, 10 December 2014)
('the FSR Bill'), available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/
FSR2014/2014%2012%2011%20FSRB%20including%20Consequential%
20Amendments%20and%2OMemo % 2 0ofo200bjects.pd), represent the most
important reforms to South Africa's financial regulatory architecture since the
1987 De Kock Commission. The degree to which these reforms succeed will
determine the extent to which South Africa can maintain financial stability,
and manage the effects of a future financial crisis.
The De Kock Commission's findings led to the creation of the Financial
Rand, and a dual exchange rate system for South Africa (Pieter Cornelis Smit
Economics: A Southern African Perspective (1996) 421). The current proposed
reforms introduce two regulators for the Republic's financial sector - a
so-called 'Twin Peaks' regulatory model: a Prudential Authority, which 'will
supervise the safety and soundness of banks, insurance companies and other
financial institutions', and a Financial Sector Conduct Authority, which 'will
supervise how financial services firms conduct their business and treat
customers' (National Treasury Media Statement 'TWIN PEAKS: Second
draft of Financial Sector Regulation Bill and draft Market Conduct Policy
Framework discussion document published for comment' (11 December
2014)). This model was first adopted by Australia, and the South African
authorities have drawn on the Australian experience (National Treasury
Media Statement 'A safer financial sector to serve South Africa better'
(23 February 2011) 28-9 and 40; Financial Regulatory Reform Steering
Committee 'Implementing a twin peaks model of financial regulation in
South Africa' (1 February 2013) 22-3; Bryane Michael 'The "Twin Peaks"
regulatory model: The future of financial regulation?' (March-April 2014)
Banking Today 3-4).
What follows is an analysis of the South African iteration of the model, and
where and how it differs from the Australian model in certain respects,

* The research for this essay was supported with funds from Melbourne Law
School and the Centre for International Finance and Regulation (Project 018).
Amongst other things, it draws upon comments submitted by the authors to the
National Treasury of South Africa in respect of the Financial Sector Regulation Bill.
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including the inter-agency co-ordination anangements, and the extent to
which the FSR Bill adequately creates the conditions for such co-ordination.
Importantly, the FSR Bill expressly recognises that the purpose of the
legislation is to 'maintain and enhance financial stability', and that its object is
'to achieve a financial system that works in the interests of financial
customers, and supports balanced and sustainable economic growth in the
Republic' (FSR Bill, Preamble and s 6, headed 'Object of this Act').
The impact of a financial crisis can be catastrophic, as the Global Financial
Crisis so amply demonstrated. It led to the closure of venerated financial
firms such as Lehman Brothers (Phillip Swagel 'The financial crisis: An inside
view' (Spring 2009) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity at 1, 2, 5 and 8) and
disrupted financial markets (and relationships) around the world (Massimiliano Cali, Isabella Massa & Dirk Willem te Velde 'The Global Financial
Crisis: Financial flows to developing countries set to fall by one quarter'
(13 November 2008) Research Reports and Studies 1; Claes Norgren 'The
causes of the Global Financial Crisis and their implications for supreme audit
institutions' INTOSAI Report (2010) 8 [49]; Guy Debelle 'Some effects of the
Global Financial Crisis on Australian financial markets' (31 March, 2009)
Finance Professionals Forum). At one stage during the Global Financial Crisis,
UK authorities activated anti-tenorism powers against Iceland's banks
(invoking s 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001; see
further Timothy Edmonds, 'Icelandic bank default' Publications & Records,
Briefing Papers (21 July 2009) 13; 'Terror law used for Iceland deposits' The
Financial Times 8 October 2008). Iceland in turn faced either the loss of
cunency sovereignty or default on their foreign debt (Mir Guomundsson
'Iceland's crisis and recovery and cunent challenges' unpublished paper
presented at a conference organised by the French-Icelandic Chamber of
Commerce; Islande, La Renaissance, 2013). By comparison, Greece chose
default (Richard M Salsman 'Greece's disgraceful debt default - and calls to
"euthanize" bondholders' Forbes 20 March, 2012 at 1).
The Bill's focus on financial stability is supported by a definition of
'financial stability'. Section 4 provides that
,there is said to be "financial stability"' if:
(a) financial institutions generally provide financial products and financial
services without interruption and are capable of continuing to do so; and
(b) there is general confidence in their ability to continue to do so.'
Section 8 of the Bill provides for the functions of the South African Reserve
Bank ('SARB') in relation to financial stability, and the method by which
financial stability should be restored or maintained in the event of a systemic
event. The definition of 'systemic event' is provided in s 1 of the Bill and
serves as a counterpart to the definition of 'financial stability' in so far as it
relates to the inability of a financial institution or a group of financial
institutions 'to provide financial products and financial services' or 'a general
failure of confidence of financial customers in the ability of one or more
financial institutions to continue to provide financial products or services'.
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Central to the 'Twin Peaks' model in South Africa is the creation of two
regulators, namely the Prudential Authority (Chapter 3 of the Bill) and the
Financial Sector Conduct Authority (Chapter 4 of the Bill). Each authority
will be a juristic person; however, the Prudential Authority will be housed
within the South African Reserve Bank ('SARB') and will operate 'within
the administration of the Reserve Bank' (s 27(1)). Under s 46 of the FSR
Bill, '[t]he Reserve Bank must provide the Prudential Authority with the
personnel, accommodation, facilities, the use of assets and other services and
resources that are determined in accordance with section 45 (1).'
There are many elements that underpin the effectiveness of the 'Twin
Peaks' system of financial regulation, under which there are separate
regulators for prudential supervision and market conduct. These include a
clear allocation of objectives and responsibilities between each regulator;
effective co-ordination between the regulators; transparency and accountability on the part of each regulator; effective powers of supervision and
enforcement; operational independence of each regulator (vis-a-vis the
executive government); a sound governance system and adequate resources
(Michael W Taylor "'Twin Peaks": A regulatory structure for the new
century' Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation Report, December
1995 at 1-3; Michael W Taylor 'The road from "Twin Peaks" - and the way
back' (2009-2010) 16 Connecticut Insurance LJ 64; Michael W Taylor
'Regulatory reform after the financial crisis - Twin Peaks revisited' Lecture
delivered at the Law and Finance Senior Practitioner Lecture Series, Oxford
University, 16 February, 2011, available at https://www.law.ox. ac. uk/events/
regulatory-reform-after-financial-crisis-twin-peaks-revisited).Most (if not all) of
these elements form part of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 'Core Principles

for Effective Banking Supervision' (September 2012) available at http://
www. bis.org/publ/bcbs230.htm).
This note will focus on three fundamental questions by reference to the
experience and current debate in Australia, which has recently undergone a
comprehensive review of the financial system, known as the Financial
System Inquiry ('FSI') (Financial System Inquiry 'Financial System Inquiry
Final Report' (November 2014)). The FSI has generated debate around a
number of fundamental issues, including the nature and structure of the
system of financial regulation in Australia. The questions that arise for South
Africa are as follows: (1) what are the implications of housing the prudential
regulator within the National Central Bank ('NCB')? (2) How should
effective co-ordination between the regulators be achieved? (3) What
substantive functions and powers should an inter-agency co-ordinating body
have?
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF HOUSING THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATOR WITHIN THE NATIONAL CENTRAL BANK?
It is noteworthy that in Australia the prudential regulator, the Australian
Prudential Regulation Authority ('APRA') (created pursuant to the Austra-
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lian Prudential Regulation Authority Act (Cth), (1998)), is separate from the
Reserve Bank ofAustralia, and is an independent statutory authority, as is the
market conduct regulator, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission ('ASIC') (created pursuant to the Australian Securities and Investments
CommissionAct (Cth), (2001)).
In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the Prudential Regulation
Authority is part of the Bank of England, and is a limited liability company,
wholly owned by the Bank of England. Its relationship with the Bank of
England is regulated by Schedule 1ZB of the Financial Services Act, 2012.
Various arguments have been made for and against each approach. In our
view, the weight of opinion (theoretically at least) is in favour of a
stand-alone regulator that is independent of the NCB, provided that
adequate co-ordination is achieved between the regulators (namely, the
market conduct regulator and the prudential regulator) and also between
each regulator and the NCB. (See for example Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio
di Giorgio 'Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given
to different agencies?' (November 1999) InternationalFinance 361 at 372-6;
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision op cit 41 p 10; Charles Goodhart
& Dirk Schoenmaker 'Institutional separation between supervisory and
monetary agencies', (October-December 1992) 51 Giornale degli economisti e
annali di economia 361; H Robert Heller 'Prudential supervision and monetary policy' International Financial Policy: Essays in Honour of jacques.J Polak
(1991) 5; Vasso P Ioannidou 'Does monetary policy affect the central bank's
role in bank supervision?' (2005) 14.Journalof FinancialIntermediation60; Jos&
Tuya & Lorena Zamalloa 'Issues on placing banking supervision in the
Central Bank' in Frameworksfor Monetary Stability: Policy Issues and Country
Experiences. Paperspresented at the sixth Seminar on CentralBanking, Washington
DC, March 1994 (1994) 680).
The arguments in favour of a stand-alone prudential regulator relate,
principally, to conflicts of interest and operational independence. From an
economics and finance perspective, Goodhart & Shoenmaker op cit at 361
have observed that a conflict of interest
,may arise between the monetary authorities, who wish for higher rates . ..
and the regulatory authorities who are frightened about the adverse effects such
higher rates may have upon the bad debts, profitability, capital adequacy and
solvency of the banking system'.
Under the FSR Bill, the Reserve Bank must deal with similarly competing
priorities. Section 12 provides that when the Reserve Bank acts to prevent or
manage a systemic risk, it must have due regard to various needs, including
the need to 'protect and maintain financial stability', which may involve the
continuing provision of financial products and financial services by financial
institutions, the need to 'protect, as appropriate, financial customers' and the
need to 'contain the cost to the Republic of the systemic event and the
measures taken to manage it'.
An assessment of these factors may involve competing priorities and give
rise to potential conflicts of interest. For example, the costs of a systemic
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event could potentially be lower in the event that a bank is deemed to have
failed, and should exit. However, a bank exit policy may conflict with the
goal of protecting financial customers where the bank in question is
designated as a systemically important financial institution, and should
therefore continue to provide financial products and financial services. Such
circumstances may create challenges in terms of determining which priority
should prevail.
Along similar lines, Ioannidou op cit at 60 has asserted that

Iwhen

the Fed tightens monetary policy, it becomes less strict in bank
supervision (i e, an increase in interest rates or a decrease in reserves is associated
with a lower probability of intervention). One possible explanation is that the
Fed tends to be less strict on bank supervision in order to compensate banks for
the extra pressure it puts on them when it tightens monetary policy. The Fed
might be interested in compensating troubled banks either because it is
concerned about possible adverse effects from bank failures on its reputation or
because it is concerned about possible knock-on effects. After all, the Fed is
responsible for maintaining the stability of the financial system and it is
responsible for the supervision of some of the biggest banks in the United
States.'

There is also evidence that an independent regulator leads to better
macro-economic outcomes, such as lower average inflation (Di Noia & Di
Giorgio op cit at 361-72) and, further, that an independent prudential
regulatory authority correlates to a more competitive banking system (ibid at
373).
From a regulatory perspective, an independent regulator comports more
closely with the Basel Committee Principles on Banking Supervision, in
particular principle 2, which states as follows:
'Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for supervisors:
The supervisor possesses operational independence, transparent processes,
sound governance, budgetary processes that do not undermine autonomy and
adequate resources, and is accountable for the discharge of its duties and use of
its resources. The legal framework for banking supervision includes legal
protection for the supervisor.'
Conversely, and from a practical perspective, there are benefits in housing
the prudential regulator within the NCB. These include the ability to
achieve synergies in relation to resources and expertise, and to avoid the
difficulties that arise in relation to information-sharing that do not present
where the central bank and the prudential regulator are one organisation. In
addition, in jurisdictions that do not have a tradition of independent
regulatory agencies, but do have a tradition of a strongly independent central
bank, housing the prudential regulator within the NCB may ensure that it
operates independently of government. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this
was a factor behind the proposed reforms in South Africa.
In Australia, the prudential regulator, APRA, was established as a standalone regulator on 1 July 1998 in response to the recommendations of the
1996 Financial System Inquiry, known as the Wallis Inquiry. This was
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established to examine the Australian financial system and led, ultimately, to
the adoption of the 'Twin Peaks' model in Australia (Stan Wallis, Bill
Beerworth, Jeffrey Carmichael, Ian Harper & Linda Nicholls Financial System
Inquiry Final Report (1997) 20). Its ability to perform its role effectively from
the outset was attributable, in part, to the movement of personnel to APRA
from the Reserve Bank of Australia ('RBA'). This ensured that APRA had
the necessary expertise for its functions, and also provided a firm basis for
co-ordination and co-operation between APRA and the RBA. Empirical
research suggests that there is general consensus among the regulators and the
RBA in support ofAPRA's stand-alone status (interviews with ASIC, APRA
and the RBA conducted by the authors inJuly 2014), and that such support is
reflected in the business community more broadly. For example, the
submission by KPMG to the FSI, commenced in Australia at the end of 2013,
stated that 'KPMG is inclined to view the current model - with APRA
remaining a separate authority focused on prudential supervision - [as] the
better arrangement' (Adrian Fisk & Ian Pollari 'Financial system inquiry,
KPMG submission' (March 2014) Financial Services 6). This, KPMG suggested, was due to its 'cultural traits', knowledge and experience, as well as
the risk of conflicts of interest that would arise if APRA were merged with
the RBA (ibid).
The regulatory design in any country has to accommodate the specific
circumstances and needs of that country. In South Africa, there are likely to
be cogent reasons for housing the Prudential Authority within the SARB. To
some extent, the FSR Bill overcomes some of the concerns that are identified
above, by clearly stipulating the objectives and internal governance structures
of the Prudential Authority. However, it will still be necessary to ensure that
the Prudential Authority achieves an appropriate level of operational independence in practice, and that the risks of conflicts of interest and competing
priorities, as referred to above, are appropriately managed.
HOW SHOULD EFFECTIVE CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN THE
REGULATORS BE ACHIEVED?
Regulatory co-ordination- soft law vs hard law
Much has been written about soft law in the context of regulation, and its
relative merits, as compared with hard law. For example, it has been said that
regulators turn to soft law in financial regulation because of the 'sociological
pull of soft law venues', the fact that soft law is 'quicker, cheaper and more
flexible' and also that it is non-binding in nature, all of which 'appeals to
fast-moving regulators who need to try things out' (Claire R Kelly 'The
sociological pull of soft law' (2012) 106 American Society of InternationalLaw
Proceedings 327). Soft law is often embodied in memoranda of understanding
between the regulatory agencies. As Ferran & Alexander state (Ellis Ferran &
Kern Alexander 'Can soft law bodies be effective? Soft systemic risk oversight
bodies and the special case of the European Systemic Risk Board', (June
2011) Legal Studies Research Paper Series 6):

762

(2015) 132 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL

'Hard law ordinarily gives rise to enforceable obligations and therefore has to be
reasonably certain and predictable so that people can determine what is
expected of them. Soft law, not being directly enforceable, can be more
open-textured.'
In Australia, the legislative framework for regulatory co-ordination is high
level and outcomes focused. Although there is a general reference to
co-ordination in the legislation governing APRA, there are no detailed
provisions as to the nature of co-ordination and how it should be achieved.
Instead, sl OA ofthe APRAAct provides in general terms as follows:
'(1) The Parliament intends that APRA should, in performing and exercising
its functions and powers, have regard to the desirability of APRA
cooperating with other financial sector supervisory agencies, and with
other agencies specified in regulations for the purposes of this subsection.
(2) This section does not override any restrictions that would otherwise apply
to APRA or confer any powers on APRA that it would not otherwise
have.'
This provision was added to implement recommendations handed down by
the HIH Royal Commission (The HIH Royal Commission 'Report of the
HIH Royal Commission' (April 2003)) 'on liaison and co-ordination with
both domestic and international regulators and other agencies' (see the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Amendment Act (Cth) (2003),
Explanatory Memorandum).
This process relies substantially on 'soft-law' mechanisms in the form of
memoranda of understanding and informal protocols between the regulators,
where the legislative framework is more facilitative, or enabling, than
prescriptive. Overseeing the process is the Council of Financial Regulators
('CFR'), which 'operates as a high-level forum for co-operation and
collaboration among its members' (The Council of Financial Regulators,
'Memorandum of understanding on financial distress management between
the members of the Council of Financial Regulators' (September 2008)).
The soft-law approach in Australia is reflected in the fact that neither the
CFR, nor the form or content of the regulatory memoranda of understanding, is prescribed by statute.
The soft-law approach was also underscored in the Interim Report of the
Australian Financial System Inquiry, which drew on the submission of the
RBA in stating that '[1]egislation cannot be relied on to promote a culture of
cooperation, trust and mutual support between domestic regulatory agencies. These have been highlighted as essential elements of an effective
financial stability framework, especially during a crisis' (Financial System
Inquiry 'Financial System Inquiry interim report' (July 2014) 3-119). Of
greater importance to the regulators in Australia, the RBA has suggested, is
cultivating a culture of co-ordination, under which the main focus is on
regulatory performance, rather than regulatory structure. The Assistant
Governor (Financial) of the RBA has attributed the efficacy of co-ordination
between the regulators in Australia to a culture
Iwhere we regard cooperation with the other agencies as an important part of
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our job, and there is a strong expectation from the public and the government
that we will continue to do so .... Key aspects [of coordination] include an
effective flow of information across staff in the market operations and
macroeconomic departments of a central bank and those working in the areas
of financial stability and bank supervision. Regular meetings among these
groups to focus on risks and vulnerabilities and to highlight warning signs can
be very valuable. A culture of coordination among these areas is very important
in a crisis because, in many instances, a stress situation is first evident in liquidity
strains visible to the central bank, and the first responses may be calls on central
bank liquidity.' (Malcom Edey 'Macroprudential supervision and the role of
central banks' (September 2012) at 3. Paper presented at the Regional Policy
Forum on Financial Stability and Macroprudential Supervision Hosted by the
Financial Stability Institute and the China Banking Regulatory Commission.)

The soft-law approach to regulatory co-ordination in Australia can be
contrasted with the more prescriptive 'hard-law' approach to regulatory

co-ordination adopted in the United Kingdom as set out below, and the
proposed approach in South Africa, as set out in chap 6 of the FSR Bill,
particularly in ss 76 and 77. Indeed, the preamble to the Bill provides
expressly that one of its objects is 'to provide for co-ordination,
co-operation, collaboration, consultation and consistency' between the
regulatory authorities. In particular, the South African model borrows from
the UK model in terms of prescribing the nature of co-ordination between
the regulators, and imposing a statutory duty on the regulators to co-operate
or co-ordinate their activities (the FSR Bill, s 76). This can be contrasted
with Australia, where, although co-operation is referred to in the legislation
governing APRA, there are no detailed provisions as to the nature of
co-operation and how it should be achieved (APRAAct, s 10A).
In the UK, s 3D of the Financial Services Act, 2012 provides as follows:
'(1) The regulators must co-ordinate the exercise of their respective functions
conferred by or under this Act with a view to ensuring (a) that each regulator consults the other regulator (where not otherwise
required to do so) in connection with any proposed exercise of a
function in a way that may have a material adverse effect on the
advancement by the other regulator of any of its objectives;
(b) that where appropriate each regulator obtains information and advice
from the other regulator in connection with the exercise of its
functions in relation to matters of common regulatory interest in
cases where the other regulator may be expected to have relevant
information or relevant expertise; .
This duty is qualified under s 3(2):
'(2) The duty in subsection (1) applies only to the extent that compliance with
the duty (a) is compatible with the advancement by each regulator of any of its
objectives; and
(b) does not impose a burden on the regulators that is disproportionate
to the benefits of compliance.'
This approach finds parallels in s 76(1) of the FSR Bill, which provides:
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'The financial sector regulators and the Reserve Bank must co-ordinate,
co-operate, collaborate and consult with each other in relation to performing
their functions in terms of this Act and the other financial sector laws.'
Under s 76(2)(b), (c) and 09, the duty to co-ordinate includes the requirement
to 'inform each other about, and share information about, matters of
common interest' (unlike the legislation in the UK (see Financial Services
Act, 2012, s 3D(3)), the FSR Bill does not expressly define 'matters of
common interest', although various examples are provided in certain
sections), 'coordinate their actions to the extent that is appropriate and
practicable' and 'interact with each other in relation to strategic directions
and understandings of national and international regulatory challenges'.
There is no direct equivalent to s 3D (2) of the UK legislation.
Regulatory memoranda of understanding
The FSR Bill makes provision for a regulatory memorandum of understanding to be entered into by the regulatory authorities (see the FSR Bill, s 77).
This will deal with various matters, including how the regulators and the
Reserve Bank will comply with their duties to co-ordinate in practice,
delegation of powers between the Prudential Authority and the Financial
Sector Conduct Authority and how differences between them are to be
resolved. In Australia, the understanding is that the memoranda of understanding between the regulators and between each regulator and the RBA
are not legally binding. This would appear to be the case under the FSR Bill.
Arguably, the hard-law nature of regulatory co-ordination in South Africa,
which involves a statutory duty to co-operate, raises various concerns,
including whether this approach will result in inflexibility (namely, an
inability to adapt to circumstances as and when they arise), and a culture that
is more concerned with compliance than in achieving appropriate outcomes.
Our findings, derived from interviews conducted with the regulators in
Australia, suggest that a flexible approach to co-ordination, able to adapt to
the circumstances, enabled the Australian regulators to deal effectively with
the challenges arising out of the Global Financial Crisis and the 2010
Sovereign Debt Crisis. It was evident that over-prescription, or formalisation, would have stifled this flexibility.
Some flexibility to managing crises or systemic events is achieved in
s 12(3) of the FSR Bill, which provides that the Governor of the Reserve
Bank 'may establish a management committee, consisting ofsenior represen-

tatives of the Reserve Bank, the financial sector regulators and other relevant
organs of state, to assist with co-ordinating activities to manage a systemic
event referred to in subsection 1 (b) and its effects'.
Empirical evidence suggests that the experience in Australia is that the
memoranda of understanding do not have any practical effect or utility in
terms of achieving the relevant outcomes, and that neitherASIC norAPRA
relies strictly on the letter of the memoranda of understanding. Instead, the
main value of the memoranda is in signalling to the public how the regulators
intend to achieve effective co-ordination, and also the process by which they
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are reviewed from time to time (interviews conducted with the regulators by
the authors in July 2014). The FSR Bill provides in s 77(3) that '[t]he
financial sector regulators and the Reserve Bank must review and update the
memoranda of understanding as appropriate, but at least once every three
years.' In the UK, s 3E(4) the Financial Services Act, 2012 provides that the
memorandum of understanding between the regulators must be reviewed at
least once in each calendar year.
WHAT SUBSTANTIVE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS SHOULD AN
INTER-AGENCY CO-ORDINATING BODY HAVE?
The South African model borrows from the Australian model in terms of
establishing a Council of Financial Regulators ('CFR'), a body that has no
equivalent in the UK. An interesting difference between South Africa and
Australia, however, is that the CFR will have a statutory basis under the FSR
Bill, whereas the CFR has no statutory basis in Australia, reflecting the
soft-law approach we noted above. In addition, the CFR in Australia 'has no
legal functions or powers separate from those of its individual member
agencies' (The Council of Financial Regulators 'About the CFR' (20132014), available at http://www.cfr.gov.au/about-cfr/index.html/). The question
whether the CFR should have a statutory basis has been the subject of recent
debate in Australia in the context of the FSI, including whether greater
transparency and accountability should be introduced into the regulatory
system in Australia.
As the RBA outlined in its submission to the Financial System Inquiry
(FSI) (Reserve Bank of Australia 'Submission to the Financial System
Inquiry' (March 2014) 66):
'The CFR is the coordinating body for Australia's main financial regulatory
agencies. Its membership comprises APRA, ASIC, the RBAand the Treasury. The
CFR was established in 1998 following the recommendations of the previous
Financial System Inquiry (the Wallis Inquiry). It is a non-statutory interagency
body, and has no regulatory functions separate from those ofits four members.
CFR meetings are chaired by the Reserve Bank Governor, with secretariat
support provided by the RBA. They are typically held four times per year but
can occur more frequently if required. As stated in the CFR Charter, the
meetings provide a forum for:
* identifying important issues and trends in the financial system, including
those that may impinge upon overall financial stability;
* ensuring the existence of appropriate coordination arrangements for
responding to actual or potential instances of financial instability, and
helping to resolve any issues where members' responsibilities overlap; and
* harmonising regulatory and reporting requirements, paying close attention
to the need to keep regulatory costs to a minimum ....
Much of the input into CFR meetings is undertaken by interagency working
groups, which has the additional benefit of promoting productive working
relationships and an appreciation of cross-agency issues at the stafflevel.
The CFR has worked well since its establishment and, during the crisis in
particular, it has proven to be an effective means of coordinating responses to
potential threats to financial stability ....
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The experience since its establishment, and especially during the crisis, has
highlighted the benefits of the existing non-statutory basis of the CFR.'
By contrast, section 79(2) of the FSR Bill makes provision for the operation
and responsibilities of the CFR, stating that its function is to 'facilitate
co-ordination, co-operation, collaboration, consultation and consistency, by
allowing senior officers of its constituent institutions to discuss and inform
themselves about matters of common interest, including strategic directions
to be adopted, and understanding and meeting international and domestic
regulatory challenges'. Membership of the CFR includes representatives
from the regulatory authorities and certain departments, and the heads of any
organ of state or other organisation that the Minister determines.
The open-ended nature of the membership of the proposed CFR in South
Africa raises some queries and provides an interesting contrast with the
approach in Australia, where the membership is limited to APRA, ASIC, the
RBA and the Treasury. It should be noted, however, that submissions to the
FSI had called for the membership in Australia to be extended to other
regulatory agencies (see for example, the submissions of the Commonwealth
Bank ofAustralia, 'Wellbeing, resilience and prosperity for Australia, Financial System Inquiry' (March 2014) 88, and Fisk & Pollari op cit at 4).
However, this recommendation was not subsequently accepted in the FSI
Final Report. The FSR Bill further provides that meetings of the Council
must be held at least twice a year (FSR Bill, s 80(1)). By contrast, the
expectation in Australia is that the Council will meet at least four times each
year, and that the Council will include working groups and subcommittees
in areas such as enforcement, legislation, standard-setting and financial
inclusion (FSR Bill, s 81).
As we have noted above, the FSR Bill makes a general provision for the
CFR. As yet, there is no indication as to what, if any, substantive powers and
functions it will have. Two questions arise in this regard: (1) should the
Council have substantive powers and functions that go beyond its consultative and co-ordinating role? and (2) how should accountability and transparency be achieved?
These two questions were the subject of submissions to the FSI in Australia
and various stakeholders suggested that the role and functions of the Council
of Financial Regulators should be enshrined in statute. For example, KPMG
submitted that the Council's 'role, transparency and accountability would be
strengthened if it were given statutory recognition' (Fisk & Pollari op cit at
5). In addition, the National Australia Bank recommended that 'the Council
of Financial Regulators (CFR) should be given a more formal structure and
be tasked by the Treasurer to coordinate the implementation of regulatory
change by APRA and ASIC' (National Australia Bank 'NAB Submission to
the Financial System Inquiry' (March 2014) 3.2.2, p 4).
One concern in having a statutory-based inter-agency co-ordinating body
is that it might be treated as the only channel through which inter-agency
co-ordination can be achieved. In this regard, it is relevant to note that
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s 79(4) of the FSR Bill provides that '[t]his section does not limit the powers
or duties of the Council of Financial Regulators' constituent institutions,
including other powers and duties in relation to consultation, co-operation
and co-ordination'.
A further concern, which was expressed by the RBA in its submission to
the FSI, is that 'formalising the CFR with explicit responsibilities and policy
tools would involve transferring agency constituent powers to the CFR,
with the risk of blurring lines of responsibility that to date have worked well'
(Reserve Bank of Australia 'Submission to the Financial System Inquiry',
(March 2014) 67). In other words, conferring explicit powers and responsibilities on the CFR that go beyond its consultative and co-ordinating role
might cut across the powers and responsibilities of the member agencies. A
better approach, it has been suggested, is for the Council of Financial
Regulators to be 'seen as the collaborative dimension of the regulatory
agencies' activities, rather than as a separate body with its own ability to make
the regulatory agencies cooperate' (Financial System Inquiry 'Financial
System Inquiry Interim Report' op cit at 3-119). This is consistent with the
approach of one of the regulators, expressed during interviews conducted by
the authors, that giving formal co-ordination powers to the CFR may
confuse accountability and require a more intrusive infrastructure, and that
the system in Australia works well without one body directing the process.
Further, what is critical to regulatory co-ordination is, at a formal level, the
regular meetings of the Council of Financial Regulators and its working
committees and, at an informal level, the relationship between the people
involved (interviews with the regulators inJuly 2014).
In its submission, the RBA noted that although formal structures for
co-ordination between agencies might assist to mediate the resolution of
differences between regulatory agencies, and thereby enforce outcomes, 'it is
unclear how reassigning part of a regulatory agency's constituent powers to
an overarching body will influence coordination and effectiveness of
regulatory policies. Similarly, it remains to be seen if formality is the feature
of institutional arrangements that ensures better outcomes' (Reserve Bank of
Australia 'Submission to the Financial System Inquiry' op cit at 53).
Underlying this reservation, it is suggested, is a concern that formalising
the role of the CFR and the inter-agency co-ordinating arrangements might
distract from the flexibility and robustness required to make co-ordination
work; namely, it might result in a situation where the regulators involved are
more concerned about complying - and being seen to comply - with the
formal requirements, than they are about regulatory performance and
achieving the desired outcomes. This may have been one of the reasons why
the FSI Final Report did not recommend any fundamental change to the
current institutional arrangements. The approach in Australia appears to be
reflected in the approach in South Africa, where the Council of Financial
Regulators has a facilitative function and is not granted express powers that
might cut across the powers and responsibilities of its members.
One area in which there has been some limited development in Australia
in relation to the CFR is increased transparency in the form of a webpage for
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the CFR on the website of the Australian Commonwealth Treasury (The
Council of Financial Regulators 'Welcome to the Council of Financial
Regulators' (2013-2014), available at www.cfau/). The webpage contains
information about the Council, media releases, publications and other
resources. This is in line with the views expressed in the FSI Final Report
that 'there would be benefit in increasing the transparency of the CFR's
deliberations, including its assessment of financial stability risks and how
these are being addressed'. To date, however, the minutes of the meetings of
the CFR have not been published. By contrast, s 57(2)(b) of the first draft of
the FSR Bill provided for a higher level of transparency, by stipulating that
the meetings of the CFR 'must be published on the National Treasury's
website for public information, unless the decision involves confidential
information'. This provision was not carried over into the second draft of the
FSR Bill.
CONCLUSION
The move in South Africa towards a 'Twin Peaks' model of financial
regulation is a significant reform that should promote financial stability and
strengthen South Africa's ability to manage and mitigate the effects of
financial crises. The experience of Australia provides some insights into the
challenges that this model presents, particularly in the area of regulatory
co-ordination, and the various ways in which these challenges might be
overcome. One of the key lessons suggested by the Australian experience is
that the legislative and regulatory framework is a necessary - but, of itself,
insufficient - element in terms of achieving the desired outcomes. Of equal
importance is a 'culture of co-ordination' under which the main focus is on
regulatory performance rather than regulatory structure. In this regard, the
high-level, outcomes-focused and 'soft-law' approach adopted in Australia
offers an interesting contrast to the more prescriptive 'hard-law' approach in
the United Kingdom, and the proposed approach in South Africa. Of critical
importance, this note suggests, is achieving an appropriate balance between
formality and flexibility; namely, making clear provision for the nature and
scope of regulatory co-ordination while at the same time ensuring that the
system is sufficiently flexible to allow it to adapt to specific circumstances, as
and when they arise.

